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Game Theory Expert Witnesses

Litigation involving game theory typically arises in antitrust, auction, and complex pricing disputes where the strategic behavior of competing firms or bidders is central to the case. Disputes commonly involve antitrust claims alleging coordinated or anticompetitive pricing behavior among competitors, disputes over auction design and bidding behavior in procurement or spectrum auctions, and contract disputes involving mechanism design in matching markets such as resource allocation and assignment systems. Financial institutions and corporations also face disputes over whether pricing algorithms or negotiation strategies reflected rational, good-faith economic behavior rather than collusive or manipulative conduct. The central issue in these matters is typically whether the strategic or pricing behavior at issue is consistent with rational competitive conduct or reflects coordinated, manipulative behavior.

Game theory experts help attorneys evaluate these disputes by modeling the strategic incentives and likely behavior of rational market participants under the specific market structure at issue. Their analysis can determine whether observed pricing or bidding patterns are consistent with independent competitive behavior or instead suggest coordination, whether an auction or mechanism design produced outcomes consistent with its stated objectives, and whether a negotiation or pricing strategy reflects rational economic behavior given the information available to the parties. This work supports liability and damages positions in antitrust, auction, and mechanism design disputes, and it can substantiate or rebut claims of coordinated or manipulative market behavior.

Because game theory disputes require rigorous mathematical and economic modeling, the right expert typically combines formal training in game theory or economic theory with practical experience applying that training to real-world market and antitrust questions. Round Table Group's game theory network includes economists and mathematicians with expertise in mechanism design, auction theory, and industrial organization, several of whom have pioneered applications of game theory to settlement negotiations and litigation strategy. Round Table Group has completed more than 75,000 expert searches for litigators, and we apply that experience to connect counsel with game theory experts whose modeling holds up under rigorous scrutiny. Let us help you find the right game theory expert for your case by calling us at (202) 908-4500.

Kinds of Cases We Work On

Round Table Group helps our clients find a wide variety of Game Theory expert witnesses for cases like:

01

The Spectrum Bids Signaled Collusion.

A telecommunications carrier sued two rival bidders in a national spectrum license auction, alleging their round-by-round bidding patterns on adjacent license blocks constituted tacit signaling designed to divide the available spectrum without engaging in explicit collusion, artificially suppressing the prices the carrier ultimately paid for its own licenses. We identified experts with experience in auction theory and mechanism design, bidding pattern econometric analysis, and spectrum auction market structure. The expert's analysis of the bid sequence found a pattern of price signals consistent with tacit coordination and inconsistent with independent value-maximizing bidding, supporting the carrier's antitrust claim in a substantial settlement.
02

Whose Bargaining Solution Set the Rate.

A smartphone manufacturer and a standard-essential patent licensor disputed the royalty rate owed under a FRAND commitment after negotiations broke down, with each side proposing a different royalty base and rate that it argued reflected reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. We identified experts with experience in cooperative bargaining theory, FRAND royalty rate methodology, and standard-essential patent licensing analysis. The expert's Nash bargaining solution model, calibrated to comparable licenses in the same patent pool, established a defensible royalty range the court adopted in setting the final rate.
03

The Capacity Bids Withheld Supply.

A regional grid operator sued a power generator after the generator's bidding strategy in the wholesale capacity market repeatedly withheld available generation capacity during periods of tight supply, alleging the strategy was designed to exploit its market position and drive up clearing prices rather than reflect genuine operating costs. We identified experts with experience in electricity market bidding strategy analysis, oligopoly and strategic withholding modeling, and capacity market design. The expert's game-theoretic analysis of the generator's bid-cost relationship found bidding patterns inconsistent with competitive behavior and consistent with strategic withholding, supporting the grid operator's claim in a substantial settlement.
04

The Pricing Algorithm Coordinated Prices.

A hotel chain sued a competing chain and the shared revenue management software vendor both had adopted, alleging the software's shared pricing recommendations had facilitated tacit price coordination across a regional market without any direct communication between the two chains. We identified experts with experience in algorithmic pricing and tacit collusion modeling, oligopoly game theory, and pricing software mechanism analysis. The expert's simulation of the software's recommendation algorithm found it systematically converged competitors toward a shared price point well above what independent optimization would produce, supporting the plaintiff's claim in a substantial settlement.
05

The Revenue Formula Rewarded Losing.

A professional sports franchise sued its league over a revenue-sharing and salary cap formula the franchise argued created a perverse incentive for lower-performing teams to reduce investment in player payroll, disadvantaging competitively ambitious franchises that invested more heavily under the same formula. We identified experts with experience in cooperative game theory applied to revenue sharing design, sports league incentive structure analysis, and mechanism design for competitive balance. The expert's modeling of the formula's incentive structure found it was not incentive-compatible with sustained competitive investment, supporting the franchise's claim in mediation with the league.
06

The Sealed Bids Weren't Independent.

An institutional buyer that had run a sealed-bid procurement auction for a multi-year equipment supply contract sued the winning bidder and a losing bidder after discovering the two companies had exchanged pricing information shortly before submission, alleging the exchange had allowed the winning bidder to submit an artificially low but still profitable bid. We identified experts with experience in auction theory and sealed-bid mechanism design, bid rigging detection methodology, and competitive bidding econometric analysis. The expert's statistical analysis of the bid distribution found a pattern inconsistent with independent bidding and consistent with coordinated bid submission, supporting the buyer's claim in a substantial settlement.
07

The Pool Split the Royalties Wrong.

A member of a multi-party patent pool sued the pool's administrator and its fellow member companies after a dispute arose over the formula used to allocate pooled licensing revenue across member patents, alleging the allocation methodology systematically undervalued its own patents' contribution to the licensed standard. We identified experts with experience in patent pool royalty allocation methodology, cooperative game theory value allocation, and standard-essential patent contribution analysis. The expert's Shapley-value-based reallocation of the pool's revenue found the member's patents had been undercompensated relative to their marginal contribution to the standard, supporting a substantial reallocation in arbitration.
08

The Matching Algorithm Favored the Platform.

A fleet operator that supplied drivers to a ride-hailing platform sued the platform after a change to its rider-driver matching algorithm consistently routed the operator's drivers to lower-value trips relative to independent drivers on the same platform, reducing the operator's revenue under a volume-based partnership agreement. We identified experts with experience in two-sided market matching design, algorithmic market mechanism analysis, and platform economics. The expert's analysis of the matching algorithm's trip allocation logic found a systematic weighting factor that disadvantaged fleet-affiliated drivers relative to the partnership agreement's stated equal-treatment terms, supporting the operator's claim in a substantial settlement.
09

The Ad Auction Wasn't Second-Price.

A national advertiser sued the ad exchange it used for real-time bidding after discovering the exchange's auction mechanism had, contrary to its published second-price design, been charging winning bidders closer to their actual bid amount, resulting in the advertiser consistently overpaying relative to what a properly implemented auction would have charged. We identified experts with experience in auction theory and mechanism design, real-time bidding market analysis, and ad exchange auction implementation review. The expert's reconstruction of the auction's clearing logic from bid and price data confirmed a systematic deviation from the published second-price mechanism, supporting the advertiser's claim in a substantial settlement.
10

The Profit Split Punished the Builder.

One partner in a real estate development joint venture sued the other after a dispute arose over the venture's profit-sharing formula, alleging the formula rewarded the partner who contributed capital while penalizing the partner responsible for construction management whenever the project ran over budget for reasons outside that partner's control. We identified experts with experience in cooperative game theory applied to joint venture profit allocation, incentive compatibility analysis, and construction risk allocation modeling. The expert's modeling of the formula's incentive structure found it was not incentive-compatible with the construction partner's actual risk exposure, supporting a renegotiated allocation in mediation.

Here are a few of our favorite Game Theory Expert Witnesses:

California Game Theory, Altruism Expert #18312

I have 3 years of experience in the field of game theory, econometrics, and industrialization. I am a professional economist. I have published and continue to do research on such topics as big box retailing, altruism and charitable contributions, auction behavior, and the economics of education.

 

Pennsylvania Game Theory, Stability Expert #20390

I have 3 years of experience in the field of economics, with specific knowledge of mechanism design, game theory and student assignment algorithms. I have published on such topics as school choice, matching markets and resource allocation.

 

Hawaii Game Theory Expert #22221

I have 15 years of experience, and specialize in the field of economics with specific knowledge in the areas of probability, game theory and statistics. I have published on such topics as business statistics and medical testing.

 

Illinois Asset Pricing, Game Theory Expert #22596

I have 6 years of experience, and specialize in the field of macroeconomics with specific knowledge in the areas of asset pricing, monetary policy and game theory. I have published on such topics as bubbles in stock markets, game theoretic models of forecasting strategies and interest rate rules for monetary policymakers.

 

Illinois Game Theory, Probability Expert #24839

I have 41 years of experience in the field of mathematics, with specific knowledge of game theory, probability and computer simulation. I have published on such topics as social choice theory, game theory and experimental mathematics.

 

Your Case Deserves The Best Game Theory Expert Witnesses

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The right expert witnesses and consulting experts can make your case. That’s why we have spent so many hours over the past quarter century making sure our clients have just the right expert team — whether one expert or many, early-stage advice or expert reports and testimony. Across over 50,000 expert search assignments, we have honed a unique, customized approach to identifying, analyzing and connecting with expert talent so you can focus on winning your case.

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Game Theory Expert #25605

I have 6 years of experience, and specialize in the field of economics with specific knowledge in the areas of industrial organization, game theory and experimental economics. I have published on such topics as charitable behavior, debt financing and entry and severance payments.

 

California Topology, Geometry, Game Theory Expert #29235

I have 16 years of experience, and specialize in the field of mathematics with specific knowledge in the areas of topology, geometry and game theory. I have published on such topics as advanced calculus and topology.

 

Ohio Gambling, Game Theory Expert #32837

I have 25 years of experience in the field of mathematics, with specific knowledge of physical modeling, education and gambling. I have published on such topics as counting (combinatorics), statistics and compex analysis.

 

Game Theory Expert #34871

I have 23 years of experience and specialize in the field of economic theory, with specific knowledge of game theory, choice theory and fair division problems. I have published on such topics as game theory, fair-division problems and choice theory.

 

Washington D.C. Game Theory Expert #35856

I have 20 years of experience and specialize in the field of rational decision making with specific knowledge in the areas of game theory, pricing and corporate ethics. I have published on such topics as pricing, cooperation and conflict, and treaty design. I have testified on pricing.

 

Massachusetts Economics, Game Theory Expert #37240

I have 3 years of experience, and specialize in the field of economics with specific knowledge in the areas of industrial organization, e-commerce and finance. I have published on such topics as economics and e-commerce. I have testified on pricing in e-commerce markets.

 

Put Our Game Theory Expert Network to Work for You

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Our huge network of experts – eminent university professors and practitioners who have achieved renown as thought leaders in their fields – combined with unparalleled research capabilities puts the experts you need at your disposal when and where you need them.

If you’re a litigator or general counsel, we want to put this network to work for you and your clients. Let us know how we can help by calling us at (202) 908-4500 or filling out the form on this page. We’re so confident you’ll love what we do that unless you retain an expert we present there’s no charge!

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Questions Attorneys Ask About Game Theory Expert Witnesses:

A game theory expert becomes relevant once a case turns on whether observed pricing, bidding, or negotiation behavior is consistent with rational competitive conduct — for example, in an antitrust dispute over coordinated pricing, an auction or procurement bidding dispute, or a mechanism design dispute involving resource allocation systems.
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